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1. Introduction 
 
In present-day argumentation theory, a distinction can be made between two types 
of theories: dialectical and rhetorical theories.1 One of the most important differences 
between these theories – approaches, or perspectives – relates to the type of criteria 
involved when analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse. Dialectical theories 
tend to use procedural criteria, which implies that argumentation is evaluated positively 
as far as it is in accordance with a number of rules that ensure its reasonableness. In 
rhetorical theories, the emphasis lies on the effect produced by the argumentation, which 
implies that argumentative discourse is analyzed and evaluated in view of its potential to 
persuade the audience. 
 To some extent, these differences between dialectical and rhetorical theories may 
seem insurmountable. At the same time, there is a growing consensus amongst present-
day scholars that it is desirable to overcome the limitations of a one-sided approach by 
combining in their theories both dialectical and rhetorical insights.2 In the research 
project I am taking part in, ‘Rhetorical and dialectical analysis,’ this combination is 
achieved by incorporating rhetorical insights in the pragma-dialectic theory of 
argumentation. My contribution to this project consists in clarifying the philosophical 
rationale of such an integration of dialectic and rhetoric. In particular, I am studying the 
relationship between the two disciplines and its historical development. Pinpointing the 
origins of the discord between dialectic and rhetoric will serve as a starting point for the 
development of a framework on the basis of which the integration of the two disciplines 
may be further legitimized. 
 Since antiquity, it is a matter of dispute which philosophers ‘invented’ dialectic 
and rhetoric as disciplines.3 However, it is clear that, in the earliest period, both 
disciplines evolved more or less independently. The question of the relationship between 
dialectic and rhetoric emerges only in the work of Plato and Aristotle. These philosophers 
not only described the subject and the ends of dialectic and rhetoric, they also reflected 
explicitly on the relationship between these two disciplines. Throughout his dialogues, 
Plato argues for the primacy of dialectic, whereas Aristotle emphasizes that dialectic and 
rhetoric are ‘counterparts.’4
I shall concentrate on Plato’s critique of rhetoric and the implications of this 
critique for his view of the relationship between dialectic en rhetoric. As it is generally 
percieved, for Plato, the relationship between both disciplines coincides with the 
relationship between the philosopher and the sophist. After all, Plato designated dialectic 
as the outstanding method of philosophy, and, in close connection with this, he criticized 
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rhetoric as it was practiced and taught by the sophists. The philosopher is a dialectician, 
and the sophist perpetrates rhetoric. I shall elucidate this view of the relationship between 
dialectic and rhetoric by giving a short description of the three phases of dialectic that can 
be discerned in Plato’s dialogues, as well as his well-known critique of rhetoric in the 
Gorgias. 
A revision of Plato’s critique of rhetoric in two other dialogues, the Phaedrus and 
the Sophist, leads to a refinement of this view. In section 3 of this paper I shall discuss the 
Phaedrus. This dialogue contains, apart from a critique of sophistic rhetoric, a description 
of a philosophically valid art of rhetoric, which implies that the philosopher may no 
longer be exclusively associated with dialectic. In section 4, I shall discuss the Sophist, in 
which eristic and elenchus – two dialectical discussion techniques – are both called 
sophistic, which implies that the sophists cannot be exclusively associated with rhetoric. 
The sophistical character that Plato attributes to eristic in the Sophist corresponds 
to his account of it in other dialogues. To the elenchus, however, Plato attributes a 
philosophical status in earlier dialogues. In section 5 of this paper, the question of what 
the systematical place of the elenchus should be will be elaborated by coordinating it with 
the way in which Plato generally distinguishes eristic from elenchus. 
 
 
2. General view of the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric according to Plato 
 
The view that the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric coincides with the 
relation between the philosopher and the sophist stems from Plato’s frequent equation of 
philosophy and dialectic on the one hand, and sophistic and rhetoric on the other. As far 
as the association of philosophy with dialectic is concerned, it is of importance to notice 
that there may be discerned three phases in the development of dialectic: in the early 
dialogues, the Socratic elenchus is prominent, in the middle ones, dialectic means 
‘hypothetical method,’ and in the later dialogues, dialectic is formulated as a method of 
synthesis and division.5 In all cases, dialectic is understood as a philosophical discipline, 
aimed at finding the truth, and in which a method is developed and used that is 
appropriate for this goal. 
 As far as the association of sophistic with rhetoric is concerned, Plato’s critique of 
rhetoric in the Gorgias is of great importance. In this dialogue, Socrates criticizes the 
pretentions of rhetoric as a tool for personal and social success. He describes sophistic 
and rhetoric as a form of flattery.6 The upshot of his critique is that sophistic and rhetoric, 
just like the other forms of flattery here discerned (cookery and cosmetics), are 
exclusively aimed at pleasance instead of the good. Socrates further says that sophists and 
rhetors are hard to distinguish, because they work on the same domain and deal with the 
same subjects.7
Plato’s description of dialectic as a philosophical discipline and his critique of 
sophistical rhetoric are to a considerable extent responsible for the emergence of the 
general view that for Plato, the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric coincides with 
that between the philosopher and the sophist.8 This is reflected in the scheme below: 
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Relationship between dialectic and rhetoric (1) 
 
philosopher    sophist   
 
dialectic elenchus/hypothetical method/ 
synthesis and division as  
described passim 
 
rhetoric      rhetoric as described 
       in the Gorgias  
 
 
3. Plato’s critique of rhetoric in the Phaedrus 
 
To a certain extent, this general view of the relationship between dialectic and 
rhetoric can be brought into line with what Plato says about rhetoric in the Phaedrus. For 
in this dialogue, Socrates criticizes writers of handbooks on rhetoric on three issues: they 
deal only with preliminaries, they lack the necessary knowledge of logical proof, and 
they leave it up to their students to find out how to achieve unity in their speeches.9 But 
besides critique, the Phaedrus also contains information on the requirements rhetoric will 
have to meet in order to be a philosophically valid art. I quote Kennedy’s summary of 
these requirements: “[…] a speaker should have good knowledge of the subject 
discussed, a good understanding of logical proof, and a knowledge of human psychology 
that makes it possible for arguments to be adapted to an audience.”10
According to Kennedy, this philosophically valid art of rhetoric is best 
exemplified in dialectic.11 However, since none of the forms of dialectic described earlier 
corresponds with the philosophical rhetoric as described in the Phaedrus, a distinction 
has to be made between philosophical dialectic and philosophical rhetoric. Therefore, the 
scheme of the relation between dialectic and rhetoric needs to be adapted in the following 
way (new information is underlined): 
 
Relationship between dialectic and rhetoric (2) 
 
philosopher    sophist   
 
dialectic elenchus/hypothetical method/ 
synthesis and division as  
described passim 
 
rhetoric philosophic or ‘good’ rhetoric sophistic or ’bad’ rhetoric 
as described in the Phaedrus as described in the Gorgias 
and the Phaedrus 
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4. Plato’s critique of the sophist in the Sophist 
 
Apart from the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, the Sophist is another Platonic 
dialogue that is relevant for the clarification of the relationship between dialectic and 
rhetoric. In this dialogue, a certain ‘stranger from Elea’ formulates seven distinct 
definitions of a sophist.12 It has been made plausible that these seven definitions 
correspond to various persons or groups that played a role in the early history of rhetoric 
and sophistic. I shall briefly describe these definitions and correspondences.13
Definitions I-IV define the sophist as a hired hunter of rich young men, as a 
merchant, as a retail dealer, and as a manufacturer and salesman of information 
respectively. These definitions probably apply to rhetorical sophists and lecturers of the 
type represented in the fifth century by Protagoras, Gorgias and Hippias. Definition V 
defines the sophist as eristic, professionally represented by men like Euthydemus and his 
brother, the dialecticians of the Eleatic school, and the Megarians. Definition VI provides 
an adequate account of the elenchus as it was practiced by Socrates. Finally, definition 
VII defines what is essential of all these sophists, namely that they are makers of a false 
conceit of wisdom. 
 On the basis of these definitions of sophistry, the scheme of the relationship 
between dialectic and rhetoric can now be completed. The part that encompasses 
sophistical rhetoric will be further specified, and the fifth and sixth definition of the 
sophist, which apply to eristic and the Socratic elenchus respectively, are as different 
variants included in the sophistical dialectic part. Additions are underlined. 
 
Relationship between dialectic and rhetoric (3) 
 
philosopher    sophist   
 
dialectic philosophic or ‘good’dialectic: sophistic or ‘bad’ dialectic:  
elenchus/hypothetical method/  eristic and elenchus as  
synthesis and division as  described in the Sophist
described passim 
   
rhetoric philosophic or ‘good’ rhetoric sophistic or ’bad’ rhetoric 
as described in the Phaedrus as described in the Gorgias, 
the Phaedrus, and the Sophist
 
This scheme serves as a framework that clarifies the way in which Plato 
conceived the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric. Within this framework, both 
the philosophic and the sophistic variants of dialectic and rhetoric have their own 
systematic place. The Socratic elenchus, however, is mentioned twice. In order to clarify 
this double listing, I shall continue with an elaboration on the way in which Plato 
distinguishes between elenchus and eristic. First, I give an account of the structure and 
the rules of the Socratic elenchus, and the absence of these rules in an eristic discussion. 
Then I argue that the elenchus is solely a philosophical mode of dialectic which has its 
sophistic counterpart in eristic. 
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5. Elenchus and eristic 
 
The term ‘Socratic elenchus’ refers to the method that is used by Socrates in 
Plato’s dialogues. The argumentative goal of this method is the refutation of the 
standpoint of the interlocutor. This standpoint is brought into the discussion by answering 
a question that was posed by Socrates (the ‘main question’). Thereupon, Socrates poses a 
number of other questions, each of which is answered by his interlocutor. Usually, the 
elenchus takes the form of a syllogism in which the answers that are given function as 
premises. By ‘syllogizing’ these answers, Socrates deduces either a contradiction or the 
negation of the answer to the main question. In both cases, the standpoint of the 
interlocutor is considered refuted.14
 The elenchus is a part of the dialectical ‘method of hypotheses’ endorsed by Plato 
in his middle period.15 This method consists in a procedure for testing the truth of a 
hypothesis. The elenchus represents the negative part of this procedure; by finding out 
whether or not the consequences of the hypothesis are consistent (internal as well with 
the hypothesis itself), the hypothesis may either be rejected or provisionally accepted. In 
the positive part of this procedure, the plausibility of the hypothesis may be increased by 
deducing it from a ‘higher’ hypothesis. From the fact that the elenchus is an important 
part of this philosophical method, it may be concluded that the elenchus is a 
philosophically valid art of dialectic as well. 
Eristic has the same structure and the same negative aim as the elenchus. An 
eristic disputer tries to win the discussion by deducing a contradiction from the answers 
of his interlocutor, thereby refuting his standpoint. This might be the reason why they are 
both called ‘sophistic’ in the Sophist. In order to make it clear that eristic, unlike the 
elenchus, is a sophistic technique of refutation, I shall describe two rules of the elenchus, 
that are absent in eristic. 
1. The ‘clarification’ rule. The elenchus may be described as a game for two 
persons; the one is asking questions, and the other is giving answers. It is the task of the 
questioner to refute ((ex-)elégchein) a certain thesis, and it is the task of the answerer to 
defend it (logon/elegchon didónai).16 These roles are fixed and cannot be changed during 
the game.17 The answerer, however, is allowed to ask for a clarification in case he does 
not understand the question.18
2. The ‘say what you believe’ rule.19 This rule guarantees that the answerer is 
convinced of the truth of the statements he puts forward in the discussion. Socrates 
explicitly refers to the existence of this rule when the interlocutor turns his standpoint 
into a conditional (éstoo: let it be the case that / let’s assume), cites somebody else’s 
opinion, or refers to the opinion of the crowd. In his reaction to such discussion moves, 
Socrates states that he will take the utterances as the personal opinion of the interlocutor, 
and expects him to defend it as such.20
 In the eristic discussion mode, both rules are lacking.21 The first rule, which 
concerns the possibility of the clarification of utterances that have remained unclear, 
would frustrate the attempt to win the discussion. The eristic questioner deliberately tries 
to trick the interlocutor by using ambiguous expressions. He thereby often attributes a 
meaning to an utterance of the interlocutor that is different from the meaning the latter 
intended.22 In the Euthydemus, for instance, Dionysodorus replaces the predicative 
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meaning of ‘being’ with the existential meaning in the course of the discussion. By doing 
so, he is able to blame his interlocutors for wanting their pupils not to become wise, but 
to die. If he would have obeyed the first rule, he could not have performed this trick. This 
might be the reason why, later on in the dialogue, Dionysodorus gets so angry when 
Socrates asks for clarification of the meaning of an utterance.23  
  Evidently, eristic furthermore differs from the elenchus because of the fact that it 
has no rule that guarantees any personal engagement with the truth of a standpoint. Since 
it is the exclusive aim of eristic to win the discussion, it is not important whether or not 
the standpoints somebody put forward in a discussion are considered true by that person. 
The second rule of the elenchus is therefore also absent in eristic.24
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
So far, I have made it clear that the general view of the way in which Plato 
concieves the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric can be refined in two respects. 
These refinements can be accomodated with the fact that Plato values dialectic higher 
than rhetoric and philosophy higher than sophistry by changing the general view into the 
following one: Plato values the philosophical variants of dialectic and rhetoric higher 
than their respective sophistic counterparts. 
 However, there is one more problem to be solved. Why is the elenchus in the 
Sophist portrayed as a sophistical variant of dialectic? One possible reason for this has 
already been given: both refutation techniques share the same structure. But there might 
be another reason: unlike the more advanced part of the ‘method of hypotheses’ (the 
deduction of a hypothesis from a higher one), the elenchus does not produce any positive 
results. The elenchus therefore only represents the negative side of dialectic. 
This view appears to be confirmed by Aristotle’s description of the type of 
arguments used in dialectic and the elenchus. The dialectician makes use of so-called 
peirastic arguments when he confines himself to the role of questioner, which means that 
he does not put forward and defend alternative viewpoints of his own. Apart from this, he 
uses dialectical arguments in the strict sense whenever he takes the role of answerer, 
supporting his thesis with reputable premises (in the absence of self-evident, 
demonstrative arguments).25 We may conclude that Socrates was, in Aristotle’s view, a 
semi-dialectician, because he only wanted to play the role of questioner.26
 But also the dialogue the Sophist itself contains an indication for the right place of 
the elenchus in the scheme of the relation between dialectic and rhetoric. Closer 
examination of the status of the sixth definition of the sophist gives support for the thesis 
that the Socratic elenchus, which corresponds in certain respects to the sophistic method 
of refutation, nevertheless can be understood as a philosophical variant of dialectic. After 
having given his account of the elenchus, the ‘stranger from Elea’ says that he is reluctant 
to call the people who practice this art sophists. In the end, he decides to do so, but not 
after having clarified that the sophist resembles the practitioner of the elenchus like the 
wolf resembles the dog.27 Therefore, the scheme below, although it does not reflect the 
final opinion of the ‘stranger from Elea,’ does express the hierarchy Plato himself 
installed correctly:  
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Relationship between dialectic and rhetoric (4) 
 
philosopher    sophist   
 
dialectic philosophic or ‘good’dialectic: sophistic or ‘bad’ dialectic:  
elenchus/hypothetical method/  eristic [and not elenchus] as 
synthesis and division as  described in the Sophist 
described passim 
   
rhetoric philosophic or ‘good’ rhetoric sophistic or ’bad’ rhetoric 
as described in the Phaedrus as described in the Gorgias, 
the Phaedrus, and the Sophist 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
1 See van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002). 
 
2 Ibidem. 
 
3 In his Sophist, Aristotle calls Empedocles the ‘inventor’ of rhetoric (see Diogenes 
Laërtius IX, 25 and VIII, 57). In his Synagogè technon, however, he identifies Corax en 
Tisias as the ‘inventors’ of rhetoric (see Kennedy (1994, 11). Furthermore, Aristotle calls 
Zeno of Elea the ‘inventor’ of dialectic (see Diogenes Laërtius IX, 25 and VIII, 57), 
whereas the use of the term ‘dialectic’ as a terminus technicus originates from Plato (see 
Robinson (1953, 69) with reference to Plato, Meno 75d; Republic 511b, 533c; Phaedo 
90b; Sophist 227a). 
 
4 Plato’s critique of rhetoric as practised by the sophists is a recurrent theme in his 
dialogues, esp. the Gorgias, the Phaedrus, and the Sophist. For Aristotle’s view on the 
relationship between dialectic and rhetoric, see for instance Rhetorica 1354a and 1356a. 
 
5 For a description of these various forms of dialectic see Robinson (1953), Stemmer 
(1992), and Cornford (1935). 
 
6 Plato, Gorgias 462a-466a. 
 
7 See Plato, Gorgias 465c and 520a. 
 
8 To put it mathematically, as favored by Socrates: dialectic : rhetoric = philosopher : 
sophist. 
 
9 Plato, Phaedrus 269bc. See Kennedy (1994, 30-31 and 42). 
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10 Kennedy (1994, 42) with reference to Plato, Phaedrus 277b5-c6. 
 
11 Apparently, Kennedy (1994, 39) sticks to the general view: “Finally, Plato regards true 
rhetoric as best exemplified in dialectic with which the philosopher persuades and 
ennobles the soul of his beloved.” 
 
12 A schematical account of these definitions can be found in Cornford (1935, 171) 
 
13 See Cornford (1953, 173). 
 
14 For descriptions of the structure of the elenchus, see Robinson (1953, 7-27), Vlastos 
(1999), and Stemmer (1992, ch. III). 
 
15 For an account of this method, see Robinson (1953, 105-109). 
 
16 In Stemmer (1992, 101), some of the terms Plato uses in relation to the elenchus are 
mentioned. 
 
17 See Stemmer (1992, 97-99) with reference to Charmides 163e5 ff.; Protagoras 330e3-
332a1; Alcibiades I 112e-113c en 116d5. 
 
18 See Stemmer (1992, 99) with reference to Euthydemus 295b3-9; Meno 75c8-d7. The 
questioner may also ask for clarification in case he does not understand the answer. In 
relation to this possibility Stemmer mentions Euthyphro 11e7-12d3, 13a1-b6; Meno 
77b6-78c2; Republic I 338c4-339a5. 
 
19 This rule is formulated, amongst other places, in Gorgias 500b, Republic 346a en 349a, 
Critias 49cd, Protagoras 331c, and 333bc (see Vlastos (1999, 42-45). Furthermore, 
Vlastos (1991, 111) mentions Gorgias 495a, Cratylus 49cd. Robinson (1953, 78) 
mentions Laches 193c, Meno 83d, Parmenides 137b. 
 
20 See Vlastos (1999, 42-45). 
 
21 According to Robinson and Vlastos, the distinction between elenchus and eristic is 
exclusively expressed in the ‘say what you believe’ rule. This view is criticised by 
Stemmer, who considers the first rule as the only one that is relevant for the distinction. 
See Stemmer (1992, 96-113). As far as I am aware, neither of them mentions the passage 
in the Meno in which both rules are explicitly mentioned in one and the same sentence: 
“And the dialectical style [contrary to the sophistic style] maybe requires that one should 
not only give an answer that is true, but that one should also use words of which the 
questioner has declared that he knows their meaning” (Plato, Meno 75c-d, m.t.). 
 
22 Examples in Stemmer (1992, 100) include Euthydemus 278b2-c1; Republic I 340d1, 
341a5-10; Theaetetus 167d7 ff. See also Stemmer (1992, 106-107). 
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23 Plato, Euthydemus 295b-d. See Stemmer (1992, 107). 
 
24 See Vlastos (1999, 39 and 43) with reference to the definition of eristic wisdom in 
Euthydemus 272a-b. 
 
25 See Vlastos (1991, 95, n. 55). 
 
26 The famous ‘socratic irony’ may therefore have a purely methodic character. 
 
27 Sophist 231a. See also Cornford (1935, 180-182) who reverses the analogy. 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Aristotle. 1991. On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Newly translated, with 
Introduction, Notes, and Appendices, by G.A. Kennedy. New York/Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Cornford, F.M. 1935. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist of 
Plato translated with a running commentary. London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
 
Eemeren, F.H. van and P. Houtlosser (Eds.) 2002. Dialectic and Rhetoric. The Warp and 
Woof of Argumentation Analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Kennedy, G.A. 1994. A New History of Classical Rhetoric. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Plato. 1999. Verzameld werk. Nieuwe, geheel herziene uitgave van de vertaling van 
Xaveer de Win. 5 delen, Kapellen/Baarn: Pelckmans/Agora. 
 
Robinson, R. 1953. Plato’s earlier dialectic. 2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Stemmer, P. 1992. Platons Dialektik. Die frühen und mittleren Dialoge. Berlin: De 
Gruyter. 
 
Vlastos, G. 1999. “The Socratic Elenchus”. In G. Fine (ed.), Plato 1. Metaphysics and 
Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 36-63. 
 
Vlastos, G. 1991. Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
 9 
